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A Case for Private Language 
Peter Asaro 
A. J. Ayer, in his paper "Can There Be a Private Language?", argues 
that there are really two different ways for a language to be private. 
The first is a language in which the objects of the terms in the language 
are only subjectively accessible, a language of private sensation. This is 
the sense of private language he feels most philosophers have taken in 
the debate over the possibility of private language. The way Ayer 
wishes to interpret private language is as a language which is developed 
and used by a single speaker, where the terms can refer to objects which 
are externally observable as well as to objects which are only 
subjectively accessible. To distinguish this sense of a private language, I 
shall call it a solitary language and oppose it to a language with more 
than one speaker, a social language. Ayer argues that a solitary language 
is logically possible and extrapolates from this that a language of private 
sensation might also be logically possible. 
Ayer's defense of private and solitary language depends on his 
diffusing an argument from Wittgenstein on the impossibility of 
language of private sensation. Ayer relies on his arguments for the 
possibility of solitary language to do this. I think that Ayer has taken 
Wittgenstein's argument too strictly and that by extending the 
implications of Wittgenstein's argument it can be shown that a solitary 
language is epistemically impossible, at least in the fashion that is 
required by Ayer. I will show that while it might be logically or 
metaphysically possible for a solitary individual to devise a language, it 
is epistemically impossible for a solitary speaker to fix the terms of 
language to the degree required for it to qualify as a language for that 
speaker. 
Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language 
is generally taken to be an argument against a language of private 
sensation. This interpretation takes it that a language of private 
sensation will be epistemically impossible because the references of the 
terms are not externally observable. I think that what his argument 
really amounts to is showing the epistemic impossibility of any solitary 
language, regardless of the observability of the referents. I think that 
Wittgenstein discusses private sensations because this is a clear example 
of a case of allegedly private meaning, where the referents are 
solipsistic. But Ayer points out that an individual such as Robinson 
Crusoe, if he were to shipwreck before having acquired a language, 
would be in a position to develop a language capable of describing 
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